Acute Disorder

Law of unintended consequences

Treason

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This is a letter written by a barrister regarding the refusal of the UK police to investigate crimes of Treason committed by various UK politicians in relation to cession of sovereignty to the EU.

The people of the UK own the right to govern themselves inalienably, indissolubly and in perpetuity and exercise that right through vesting in Parliament the right to bind us with its statutes and acts which are made in accordance with the law of the land. By purportedly entering into Treaties with the EU, the terms of which make EU law binding in the UK, the various politicians who have signed these treaties have committed Treason. Treason is so serious that not reporting Treason is itself a crime called Misprision of Treason.

Here is the letter.

Dear Sir,
We refer to the crime related incident numbers listed above. These concern allegations of treason in respect of:
(1) The Treaty of Maastricht (John Major, Douglas Hurd & Francis Maude); this treaty transferred sovereignty to a foreign power and the allegation is that it constitutes high treason;
(2) House of Lords reform (Tony Blair); this restricted the ability of the hereditary peers to play their proper part in Government and the allegation is that it constitutes the major crime of sedition, which at this level constitutes high treason;
(3) Closure of the Lords (David Cameron and Nick Clegg); this attempted to subvert the makeup of Parliament and the allegation is that it constitutes major crime of sedition, which at this level is high treason. We understand that you are refusing to investigate the allegations on the basis of comments by Lord Denning in R v Police Commissioner of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968] 1 AER 763. We have now had an opportunity to examine this case and our comments are as follows:

(A) The case concerns enforcement of the law in relation to gaming. The question was whether an order of mandamus would lie to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis to enforce that law. However, before the Court made a decision on the matter the Commissioner gave an undertaking to the Court that a confidential instruction not to investigate the matter would be revoked. Thus, the applicant achieved the substance of the relief that he sought. In ‘those circumstances, no order of mandamus was granted and so the comments of the Court are strictly obiter dicta rather than ratio. Thus, the case should be taken as general guidance to the Commissioner. Giving guidance is the procedure the Courts often use with the police — see R v Devon and Cornwall Chief Constable ex parte Central Generating Board [1981] 3 WLR 967. The task is therefore to discern the guidance that the Court would give to the Commissioner in these cases. In ascertaining that guidance, we emphasise that the Blackburn case must be read as a whole.

(B) As regards Lord Denning‘s comments, he makes a distinction between policy decisions where the law will not interfere and those where it will. He says that it is for the Commissioner of Police or the chief constable as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether enquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made, or a prosecution brought lt must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. He then says that the Commissioner can make policy decisions and give effect to them, as, for instance was often done when prosecutions were not brought for attempted suicide. He goes on to say that there are some policy decisions where the courts can interfere. Suppose a Chief Constable were to issue a directive to his men that no person should be prosecuted for stealing any goods less than £100 in value. He says he should have thought that the court could countermand it. Thus, the distinction is between the individual case and a more general policy. Given the number of allegations of treason that have been made and the response we have received, it appears to us that the Commissioner has adopted a policy of not investigating allegations of treason. We submit that such a policy would be countermanded by the court. Thus, the Commissioner is failing in his duty to enforce the constitutional law of England.

(C) There were two other judgments of the court We submit that these form the majority of the Court Salmon LJ says (at 771):
“In my judgment the police owe the public a clear legal duty to enforce the law a duty which l have no doubt they recognise and which generally they perform most conscientiously and efficiently. In the extremely unlikely event, however, of the police failing or refusing to carry out their duty, the court would not be powerless to intervene. For example if, as is quite unthinkable, the chief officer in any district were to issue a instruction that as a matter of policy the police would take no steps to prosecute any house-breaker, l have little doubt but that any householder in that district would be able to obtain an order of mandamus for the instruction to be withdrawn. Of course, the police have a wide discretion whether or not they will prosecute in any particular case. In my judgment, however, the action which l have postulated would be a clear breach of duty. It would be so improper that it could not amount to an exercise of discretion. Counsel for the Commissioner has argued that the discretion is absolute and can in no circumstances be challenged in the courts. He instances the policy decision not to prosecute, save in exceptional circumstances, young teenage boys who have had sexual intercourse with girts just under the age of sixteen: but this, in my view, is an entirely different and perfectly proper exercise of discretion. The object of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, which made it a criminal offence to have sexual intercourse with girls under sixteen, was passed in order to protect young girls against seduction. Unfortunately, in many of the cases today in which teenage boys are concerned, it is they rather than the girls who are in need of protection. These are not the sort of cases which the legislature had in mind when the Criminal Law Ammendment Act, 1885, was passed. Moreover, experience has shown that if young boys are prosecuted in such circumstances, the courts usually take the humane and sensible course of imposing no penalty. The object of the statute which made housebreaking a crime was quite simply to prevent housebreaking in the interests of society. Similarly, the object of s 32 to s 40 of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963,
and the corresponding provisions of the Betting and Gaming Act, 1960, which the Act of 1963 replaced, was quite simply to protect society against the evils which would necessarily follow were it possible to build up large fortunes by the exploitation of gaming. The Acts of 1960 and 1963 were designed to prevent such exploitation and would have been entirety effective to do so had they been enforced. Regrettably they have not been property enforced. As a result, and entirely contrary to the intention or contemplation of Parliament, an immense gaming industry, particularly in London, has been allowed to grow up during the past seven years. “ The English constitution is a vital matter to every citizen. Our freedoms depend upon it. Its framers meant it to be properly enforced: that is why it is protected by the strict laws of treason and sedition etc. Otherwise, the most flagrant violations would go entirely unpunished and the constitution would quickly become a dead letter. The change to the composition of the Lords, the attempt to close the Lords down and the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht are all flagrant breaches of the constitution and need to be investigated forthwith. This is not a matter where the Commissioner can say that he is exercising his discretion reasonably e.g. in not prosecuting offenders who for some special reason were not to blameworthy in the way contemplated by the Act creating the offence (see H W R Wade on Administrative Law 5ed at page 360). Nor is the matter marginal to the statute. On the contrary, these are exactly the type of situation where the framers of the treason laws would have expected action to be taken. To reiterate, changes to the composition of the legislature, or its closure and domination by a foreign power are not matters which are marginal or un-blameworthy. Put another way, it may be fairly said that the discretion of the Commissioner over prosecution and enforcement of the statutory criminal law must be so exercised as to give effect to the true intention of Parliament appearing in and from the circumstances of the relevant statute, in this case the Treason Act 1351. We submit that this Act envisages that these sort of offences will be properly investigated and, if appropriate, timely prosecutions brought.

(D) The third Judge, Edmund Davies LJ said:
“In this context counsel for the Commissioner has addressed to the court an elaborate and learned argument in support of the bald and startling proposition that the law enforcement officers of this country owe no duty to the public to enforce the law. Carried to its logical limit, such a submission would mean that, however brazen the failure of the police to enforce the law, the pubic be wholly without a remedy and would simply have to await some practical expression of the court’s displeasure. In particular, it would follow that the Commissioner would be under no duty to prosecute anyone for breaches of the Gaming Acts, no matter now flagrantly and persistently they were defined. Can that be right? Is our much-vaunted legal system in truth so anaemic that, in the last resort, R would be powerless against those who, having been appointed to enforce it, merely cocked a snook at R? The very idea is as repugnant as it is startling, and l consider it regrettable that it was ever advanced. How ill it affords with the seventeenth century assertion of ‘Thomas Fuller
that, “Be you never so high, the law is above you” The applicant is right in his assertion that its effect would be to place the police above the law. l should indeed regret to have to assent to the proposition thus advanced on behalf of the Commissioner, and, for the reasons already given by my lords, l do not regard it as well founded. On the contrary, l agree with them in holding that the law enforcement officers of this country certainly owe a legal duty to the public to perform those functions which are the raison d‘etre of their existence.”

The view that the police have taken in respect of these allegations of treason seems to us to fall directly within what Edmund Davies LJ says. To adopt the policy that the police apparently have is to put them above the law. The police owe the public a legal duty to perform their functions. This is particularly the case where the issue relates to the constitutional law of England. The framers of the laws protecting that constitution cannot have imagined that those charged with its enforcement would simply adopt a policy of not enforcing those laws. That would be, in the words of Edmund Davies LJ, “as repugnant as
it is startling“. We also wish to point out to the Commissioner that treason is not an ordinary crime. There is a duty to report it to the police and failure to do so is itself an offence, called misprision of treason. What is the point of these special provisions if the police can simply say they are not going to investigate the allegations? Surely there is none. So treason is a special case, especially at this level. This is a crucial additional factor which the courts would have to take into account when considering the general guidance to be given to the Commissioner. lt weighs in favour of action being taken. in those circumstances, and in conclusion, we strongly submit that the general guidance the Court would give to the police would be as follows. The views of the majority of the Court in Blackburn show that the Commissioner cannot simply say that he will not enforce the law, particularly not a law as important as treason, which is protected by special provisions as outlined above. Very simply, there is a law against treason and it must be enforced. This is not a case where the Commissioner would have discretion because the matter was marginal or un-blameworthy. Rather the matter is central to our constitutional law and of vital importance to every subject of the Crown. Treason touches the dignity and titles of the Monarch. These are not matters of small moment. The framers of the statute of 1351
cannot have imagined that no action would be taken if the law were to be violated. We would respectfully remind you that the law is above even the highest in the land and it must be applied to them with the same rigour as it is to an ordinary citizen. The Courts have reiterated this point Even if Lord Denning’s views are different or to be preferred, we submit that the Commissioner has adopted a policy not to enforce the treason laws given the number of allegations that have been made. This is not in any way a tenable position for him to hold.

Accordingly, we look forward to hearing from you that all these allegations of treason will be investigated as a matter of urgency as befits matters of this importance.

Of course it’s also true that while it is obvious that these politicians have committed High Treason, the majority of the legal profession, House of Lords and Commons are all also in favour of this treason having been committed, with the result that there is no possibility that any process directed through the current legal system will deliver a remedy.

Written by anubis

January 12th, 2013 at 1:48 pm